TY - JOUR T1 - Adverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market JF - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Y1 - 1997 A1 - Frank A Sloan A1 - Edward C Norton KW - Consumption and Savings KW - Demographics KW - Health Conditions and Status KW - Healthcare KW - Insurance KW - Methodology AB - Adverse selection, moral hazard and crowding out by public insurance have all been proposed as theoretical reasons for why the market for private long -term care insurance has been slow to evolve in the U.S. Using national samples of the elderly and near elderly, this study investigates which is most important. The data contain direct measures of risk aversion, expectations of future nursing home use and living to old age, and the bequest motive. For both groups, we find evidence of adverse selection, and, for the elderly, crowding out of private long-term care insurance by Medicaid. However, we do not find that demand for such insurance is motivated either by bequest or exchange motives. PB - 15 VL - 15 IS - 3 N1 - ProCite field 3 : Duke U; U NC U4 - Insurance/Insurance Companies/Analysis of Health Care Markets/Economics of the Elderly/Elderly/Insurance/Nursing/Old Age ER -